Introduction
The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 1 and Government very effectively reacted to concerns that an unqualified reference to R2P might result in 'an obligation to intervene under international law' 2 The World Summit Outcome 3 has accommodated such concerns in three steps: It first delineated the scope of application by characterising R2P as a responsibility of the State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means; 4 secondly it stressed the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting these obligations through the United Nations in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter; and thirdly it confirmed the responsibility of States 'to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a caseby-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'.
5
These three elements clearly caution expectations that R2P might be used in a hybrid manner, seemingly disregarding the Charter system rather than reaffirming it. They may also help to clarify discussion on the legal character of the concept and its role between political rhetoric and norm-creation 6 by taking a more functional approach and concentrating on the question how people in danger might be offered security and protection, rather than focussing on more metaphysical considerations and waiting for the creation of a new legal order and a global civil society that would be ready to accept it.
